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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • • 







Case No. 18128 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon, a third-degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 76-10-504 (1953), as amended, in Count I1 and with 
Theft by Receiving, a second-degree felony, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.,~ 76-6-408 (1953), as amended, in Count II of the 
Information. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury on July 15, 16 and 
20, 1981, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. A Motion to 
Suppress the evidence gained at the time of appellant's arrest 
on January 1, 1981 was heard on July 15, 1981 and denied. 
Appellant was found guilty on both counts by the jury on July 
20, 1981. Sentence of concurrent, indeterminate terms of not 
more than five years on Count I and of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years on Count II was imposed on November 
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s, 1981. Fines of SS,000 and $10,000, respectively, were also 
imposed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the court below and denying appellant's 
requests for a new trial and, in the alternative, acquittal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The home of Dr. and Mrs. Thomas Broadbent was 
burglarized on December 14, 1980, sometime between the hours 
of 1:00 and 4:00 p.m. (R. 152-153). Among the items missing 
were: an engraved desk set (R. 161, 232), Salt Lake Clinic 
identification cards (R. 163, 232), a birth certificate for 
Stephanie Broadbent (R. 164, 232), a check made out to Dr. 
Broadbent (R. 163, 232), several pieces of jewelry (R. 
170-171, 230, 232), a coin purse containing coins (R. 170), a 
sterling box (R. 233), and a pocket watch on which were the 
Duke University crest and Dr. Broadbent's initials (R. 229, 
237). Two spent bullets were found in the home although no 
blood was found (R. 156). 
According to the testimony of appellant, he obtained 
the items listed above from the perpetrators of the burglary 
(R. 305-306). Appellant testified that on December 14, 1980, 
a man named Ralf Schimerald and a companion, Lynette Gillman, 
arrived at appellant's residence at 717 South 200 East in 
-2-
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Salt Lake City in a taxi (R. 293). Although appellant no 
longer actually resided at that address, he testified that he 
was there investigating a robbery that had been reported to 
him by his girlfriend (R. 292). Some of appellant's 
belongings remained at the house (R. 294). When Ralf and 
Lynette arrived appellant went out to help Ralf inside because 
Ralf had apparently been shot (R. 294). Ralf and Lynette told 
appellant that Ralf had ~hot himself during a burglary (R. 
297). Ralf and Lynette had brought with them the stolen goods 
from the burglary. Appellant saw the name of Dr. Broadbent on 
some of those items (R. 319), although he also testified that 
he didn't know to whom the items belonged on December 14 (R. 
302). Lynette began sorting the items into piles and asked 
appellant to help her find out if the goods were "precious 
metals" and to sell them (R. 296-297). Appellant refused to 
do that but told Lynette where she might get the information 
(R. 297). Lynette and appellant left Ralf at the house and 
went downtown so appellant could point out the places where 
Lynette might sell the stolen goods (R. 298-299). Lynette did 
not take the goods with her at that time because it was too 
late in the day (R. 300). Appellant did not return to the 
house with Lynette that day (R. 300). Instead, appellant 
purchased some sandwiches for Lynette and left her at a nearby 
Miniature-Mart (R. 300). Lynette offered to leave some of the 
stolen property at appellant's home, but appellant declined 
that offer (R. 300-301). 
-3-
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Appellant returned to 717 South 200 East two or 
three days later and found Ralf and Lynette gone (R. 301). 
Ralf had left behind his bloody clothes, a mink stole and a 
sawed-off rifle (R. 301, 338). The rifle was located in a 
crawl space below the floor, inside the bedroom closet (R. 
338). None of the Broadbent property was seen by appellant in 
the house at that time (R. 341). Appellant left the gun and 
other items just as he found them (R. 301). When appellant 
again returned to the house two days later, the gun and the 
mink were gone (R. 387). 
On December 31, 1980, appellant went to his sister's 
house at 100 South and 800 West to borrow her car (R. 302). 
Appellant arrived at about 5:30 p.m. (R. 303). There were a 
dozen or so other people there (R. 303). Ralf Schimerald and 
Lynette Gillman arrived there at about 6:00 p.m. (R. 303). 
Ralf had the stolen goods from the Broadbent burglary with him 
(R. 304) and was selling the goods at very low prices (R. 
304). At that time, according to appellant, he bought some of 
the property from Ralf for $50.00 (R. 306). Appellant put the 
items he had purchased into a backpack and left his sister's 
home after about an hour, returning to his own residence (R. 
307). At one point, appellant said that he told Julie, his 
girlfriend, that he bought the stolen goods from Ralf (R. 
347), but at a later time, appellant said he did not tell 
Julie because he did not want to get her involved (R. 375). 
-4-
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From his home, appellant, Julie and his daughter, 
Mercede, went to a party (R. 308). After the party, they had 
car trouble and were unable to leave immediately (R. 309). 
When the car was repaired, appellant, Julie, Mercede and 
Julie's father, who had come to help with the car, drove to 
717 South 200 East (R. 310). They found that appellant's 
parked car had been broken into and that the house had again 
been burglarized (R. 311~. Because it was 4:00 a.m. and 
appellant was tired, he did not call the police (R. 312). 
Appellant testified that calling the police just isn't done 
(R. 312). Appellant saw the sawed-off rifle in the trunk of 
his car at that time ( R. 385). He found another gun on the 
ground outside the bedroom window where the burglars had 
apparently dropped it (R. 311). Julie gave appellant a pen 
which he used to pick up the gun, thus avoiding placing any 
fingerprints on the gun (R. 312). According to appellant, he 
intended to use the gun, and any prints found on it, to trace 
the burglars (R. 312). For that reason, appellant put the 
pistol inside his backpack. Although he allegedly intended to 
have the police department run a check on the pistol, 
appellant did not call the police (R. 313). 
The next day, January 1, at approximately 2:00 p.m., 
appellant, Julie and Mercede left the house to get something 
to eat (R. 314). Appellant took the backpack with him so that 
the burglars would not steal it if they returned (R. 383-384). 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Everything appellant had placed inside the backpack the night 
before remained there (R. 314, 383-384). Appellant testified 
that he did not remember the gun was in the backpack when he 
left home (R. 314). His testimony was contradictory as to 
when he_ remembered the pistol was inside the backpack. At one 
point, appellant said he remembered the gun while at the 
Miniature-Mart (R. 314), but later he said he remembered it 
while on his way to the market (R. 327-328). Appellant 
decided not to take the gun out of the backpack or to take it 
back to the house (R. 315, 328). 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 1, appellant 
was observed walking down the street near 717 South 200 East 
pushing a hand truck (R. 181). Officer DeWitt watched 
appellant place the hand truck in a white station wagon (R. 
183). As he observed appellant, DeWitt felt that appellant's 
activities warranted further investigation. There were 
several reasons that DeWitt decided to stop appellant: 
(1) DeWitt knew appellant and knew that he had a record (R. 
189)1 (2) DeWitt knew appellant had been evicted from the 717 
South 200 East home (R. 197); (3) DeWitt felt he had seen all 
of appellant's possessions at that time and that appellant did 
not have a hand truck (R. 189); (4) there was not much 
pedestrian traffic on the street (R. 194); (5) it seemed 
strange to DeWitt to see appellant pushing a hand truck down 
the street (R. 195)1 (6) appellant's former landlord had 
-6-
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asked that appellant be arrested if he returned to the house 
and appellant was heading in that direction when DeWitt 
stopped him (R. 197): (7) based on what he knew of appellant's 
record, DeWitt believed appellant had been involved in crimes 
previously and might possibly become involved in a crime in 
the near future (R. 204). 
While DeWitt was questioning appellant, his partner 
went over to the car to rook at the hand truck (R. 195). 
Appellant told DeWitt that the hand truck was not his, but 
that he had found it and he could use it to move so he took it 
(R. 183). The partner then radioed back to DeWitt telling him 
that the hand truck had the name "Stokes Brothers" on it (R. 
195). The officers then seized the hand truck and attempted 
to have someone at Stokes Brothers contacted (R. 194). Unable 
to do that and believing that appellant had stolen the hand 
truck, the officers placed appellant under arrest for theft of 
the hand truck (R. 185, 194). Appellant was walking in a 
direction headed away from Stokes Brothers when he was stopped 
( R. 184) • 
At the time of appellant's arrest, the officers 
searched appellant's backpack (R. 174). Inside the backpack 
was found the Broadbent property listed above and a .22 H & R 
revolver (R. 175, 177, 178, 247). Appellant was charged with 
theft by receiving and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon 
as a result of the search (R. 20). 
-7-
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After his arrest, and being advised of his rights, 
appellant gave a statement to Detective Gillies (R. 240-241). 
Appellant said then that he had gotten the property from the 
perpetrators of the Broadbent robbery but did not say he had 
bought it from them or when he had gotten it (R. 363). 
Appellant and Detective Gillies went to 717 South 200 East 
where the engraved pen set was recovered (R. 255-256). Some 
other jewelry was recove~ed and turned in to Detective Gillies 
on January 12, 1981 (R. 268). Detective Gillies told 
appellant on January 8 that he expected recovery of the 
property from the Broadbent robbery and testimony against Ralf 
and Lynette in return for favorable treatment in this case (R. 
269-270). Appellant never testified and never brought in any 
other property after January 12 (R. 273). Appellant did turn 
in a mink cape to another officer, Bruce Smith (R. 28B). He 
also gave Officer Smith information on the location of Ralf 
Schimerald, but Ralf was not found as a result of that 
information (R. 289). The sawed-off rifle used by Ralf 
Schimerald during the burglary was later found in appellant's 
car by Smith on appellant's instructions although, according 
to appellant, he knew the gun was there when he and Detective 
Gillies had gone to the house on January 5 (R. 383, 385). 
-8-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED WITHOUT WARRANT. 
Appellant claims that the evidence presented at 
trial was improperly seized by law enforcement officials and, 
therefore, should not have been admitted at trial. To-support 
this claim, appellant argues first that the officers had no 
sufficient reason to stop and question appellant when they 
observed him near 717 South 200 East on January 1, 1981. 
Second, appellant's car was illegally searched prior to his 
arrest because the facts of this case do not fit the plain 
view doctrine. Third, there was no probable cause to arrest 
appellant; and fourth, the search of appellant's backpack was 
illegal due to the lack of sufficient reason to question or 
arrest appellant. For these reasons, appellant contends, the 
evidence admitted at trial was illegally seized and should 
have been suppressed. 
It is important to note here that it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to determine the 
admissibility of evidence and the reasonableness of the search 
and seizure of that evidence. The ruling of the trial court 
on this matter is presumed to be correct and should not be 
disturbed unless it was clearly in error. See State v. 
-9-
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Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (196R) and cases cited 
therein; and see State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 271, 508 P.2d 534 
(1973). 
Although none of the evidence in this case was 
seized nor the arrest made pursuant to warrants, both fit 
within recognized exceptions to the general rule that a 
warrant must be obtained prior to all searches, seizures and 
arrests. The detention of appellant for questioning and the 
subsequent seizure of evidence and arrest of appellant were 
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The evidence 
was, therefore, properly admitted. 
A. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO 
DETAIN APPELLANT BASED ON A REASONABLE 
BELIEF THAT A CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED 
OR WAS IN PROGRESS. 
The threshold question to be considered before 
analyzing the issue of the seizure of the evidence is whether 
the stop and questioning of appellant was proper. Utah Code 
-~ Ann.,§ 77-7-15 (1953), as amended, provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Further, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968), an officer 
may stop a person and investigate his suspicious actions when 
the officer has a reasonable, good faith belief, based upon 
-10-
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articulable facts that the officer's actions are warranted. 
An "informal arrest" or brief detention is permitted where the 
circumstances do not constitute probable cause for arrest, but 
there is need for a temporary detention to investigate and 
obtain more information about a person's suspicious 
activities. The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
A brief stop of a suspicious individual, 
in order to de~ermine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while 
obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time. 
Adams v. Williams, 407 u.s. 143 (1972). See also: State v. 
Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973). The informal 
arrest or temporary detention is an "intermediate response" so 
that a police officer "who lacks • • • probable cause to 
arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to 
occur or a criminal to escape." Adams v. Williams, supra. 
-,,. 
This Court has also said that: 
When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to a suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violaten; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977); State v. 
Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103, 105 {1980). 
-11-
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The articulable facts in this case supporting an 
"informal arrest" or stop of appellant include: (1) the 
officer knew of appellant's reputation and that appellant had 
a record although he did not know the exact contents of that 
prior record (R. 189, 195)1 (2) the officer knew that 
appellant no longer lived in the area because he had been 
present when appellant was evicted (R. 189, 197)1 (3) the 
officer did not believe appellant owned the hand truck he was 
pushing because the officer felt he had seen all of 
appellant's possessions (R. 189)1 (4) there was not much other 
activity on the street (R. 194)1 (5) it seemed strange to the 
officer that appellant would be pushing a hand truck down the 
street (R. 195)1 (6) the owner of the residence from which 
appellant had been evicted a few days earlier had asked that 
appellant be arrested for trespassing if he returned to the 
property, and appellant was heading in the direction of the 
house at the time the officer stopped him (R. 197)1 (7) based 
on what the officer knew of appellant's prior record, he 
believed appellant had been involved in crimes previously and 
might possibly become involved in a crime in the near future 
(R. 204). These facts together with rational inferences, 
reasonably support a temporary detention to investigate 
appellant's actions. 
Appellant attempts to discount the officer's factual 
basis for stopping him by analyzing each fact separately. It 
-12-
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would be unfair to assume that the officer would have stopped 
appellant for any one of the reasons articulated where the 
officer testified that it was all of those facts, taken 
together, that were the motivation for the stop. These facts 
should be considered in the light in which they appeared to 
the officer at the time of the stop when determining whether 
the officer was justified under the circumstances. 
This Court has~previously considered the "informal 
arrest" or stop and deteAtion situation in State v. Torres, 29 
Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973). In that case, the Court 
said "that the test to be applied on the question as to 
whether" appellant's constitutional rights have been abridged: 
••• is one of reasonableness: that is, 
whether fair-minded persons, knowing the 
facts, and taking into consideration not 
only the rights of the individuals 
involved in the inquiry or search, but 
also the broader interests of the public 
to be protected from crime and criminals, 
would regard the conduct of the officers 
as being unreasonable [footnote omitted]. 
See also: Terry v. Ohio, supra. Furthermore, 
The determination should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the 
facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed 
the offense. State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 
318, 495 P.2d l259 (1972). 
State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (1980). 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case, taking into consideration all of the 
facts and appellant's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches, the stop and questioning of appellant 
was reasonable. Although an officer cannot base such a stop 
on "mere curiosity, rumor or hunch," In Re Tony C., 582 P.2d 
957, 959 (Cal. 1978), the officer in this case had a more 
substantial basis for the stop. The officer knew appellant 
and knew of his record. ~This, combined with the unusual 
activity in which appellant was engaged on New Year's Day and 
the fact that appellant was headed toward a location where the 
officer knew appellant had no legal right to be, was 
sufficient to justify a fair-minded person inquiring into the 
circumstances of that activity, even where that person was not 
aware of the exact contents of appellant's record. The 
officer need not know that a crime has occurred and that 
appellant is guilty7 he need only reasonably suspect that one 
has occurred or is occurring and that appellant is involved in 
its occurrence under S 77-7-15. Therefore, although the 
officer did not have probable cause to arrest appellant at the 
time he stopped appellant for questioning, the officer did 
have reasonable justification to stop appellant and inquire 
about the activity in which appellant was engaged. 
B. THE OBSERVATION OF THE HAND TRUCK IN 
OPEN VIEW WITHIN APPELLANT'S VEHICLE 
WAS NOT A SEARCH AND, THEREFORE, DID 
NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
-14-
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Appellant argues that the observation of the hand 
truck while it was inside his vehicle did not meet the 
standards of the "plain view" doctrine and therefore was an 
illegal search and seizure. The evidence at trial, however, 
was clearly contrary and met the standards of both the "plain 
view" and "open view" doctrines. 
"Open view" and "plain view" have been distinguished 
by this Court. State v. _.Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d 48 (1981). In 
the "open view" situation, the object under observation is not 
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy because the 
object is in a position lawfully accessible to the public. 
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709 (1980). Thus, 
stolen property clearly visible through an unobstructed window 
of a camper and obvious to anyone who happened to be walking 
nearby is in "open view." State v. Lee, supra. See also: 
State v. Coffman, Utah, 584 P.2d 837 (1978); State v. 
Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.~d 651 (1972). Because in the 
"open view" situation the observation takes place from a 
nonintrusive vantage point, no search within the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions is involved. State v. Lee, 
State v. Coffman, both supra; State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 
1125 (1977)1 State v. Seagull, 632 P.2d 44 (Wash. 1981); State 
v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). 
The hand truck in this case falls within the "open 
view" doctrine. The officer was standing outside appellant's 
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car looking at the hand truck which was knowingly exposed to 
the public by being placed in a position where it could be 
seen from the outside of the car. There is no evidence that 
the view of the hand truck or its lettering was obstructed in 
any way. In fact, the evidence is that the view was not 
obstructed because the officer testified that his partner was 
able to view the hand truck and its lettering without entering 
the car. The officer who testified stated that his partner 
did not enter appellant's car until after he saw the hand 
truck, read the lettering and conveyed that information over 
the walkie-talkie. The partner did not conduct a search, but 
did what any person nearby could have done; he looked through 
the car window and saw the evidence. The observation of the 
interior of a car through a window or open door does not 
constitute a search. State v. Lee, supra, at 51; see also: 
State v. Ballenberger, Utah, 652 P.2d 927 (1982). To search 
is to look into or over carefully and thoroughly in an effort 
to find or discover. State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 
709 (1980). Because there was no search, only an observation 
of evidence in open view, the hand truck was legally seized 
and could be admitted into evidence. 
Alternatively, the "plain view" doctrine can be 
applied to the facts of this case. "Plain view" is the term 
uniformly given to the doctrine invoked as justification for 
seizing evidence which officers see in the course of an 
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investigation or arrest which they detect without making a 
physical search. State v. Lee, State v. Folkes, State v. 
Echevarrieta, all supra; see also: Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 u.s. 234 
(1968). "Plain view" refers to observations which take place 
after police lawfully intrude--with a warrant for another 
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some 
other legitimate reason f-0r being present--into activities or 
areas as to which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Coolidge, supra; State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). 
The Court in Coolidge, supra, explained: 
What the "plain view" cases have in common 
is that the police officers in each of 
them had a prior justification for an 
intrusion in the course of which he came 
inadvertently across a piece of evidence 
incriminating the accused. 
403 u.s. at 466. Generally, under the "plain view" doctrine, 
the poiice officer must have prior justification to be in the 
position to view the evidence; discovery of the evidence must 
be inadvertent; the evidence must not be obstrµcted from the 
officer's sight; and the evidentiary value must be immediately 
apparent to the officer. State v. Shinault, 584 P.2d 1204 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). 
More recently, this Court listed the justifications 
for a warrantless seizure as: 
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. ·, 
(1) the officer is lawfully present where 
the search and seizure occur; (2) the 
evidence is in plain view; and (3) the 
evidence is clearly incriminating • 
State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (1983). The court 
stated in footnote 3 of that opinion that the fourth 
requirement discussed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
at 469, of inadvertent discovery was purposely omitted in the 
Romero opinion. The reasons given for that omission were that 
~. 
inadvertence was listed by only a plurality of the justices in 
Coolidge and was completely omitted as a requirement in a more 
recent decision, Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). 
Thus, it appears that inadvertent discovery is not a 
requirement of the "plain view" doctrine. 
Appellant's assertion that the observation of the 
hand truck does not meet the standards of the "plain view" 
doctrine is twofold. First, appellant claims that the 
observation of the hand truck was not inadvertent. Second, 
the officer had no legal right to be where he was at the time 
the hand truck was observed. 
That the officers were legitimately in the area may 
be easily established. The officers were on a public 
thoroughfare when they observed appellant pushing the hand 
truck down the street. The officers did not follow appellant 
into his home or any other private area. Appellant was 
stopped on a public sidewalk where any person had a right to 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be. There was no evidence that the officer was required to 
intrude upon private property to observe the hand truck inside 
of appellant's car. The United States Supreme Court has said 
that a person has no justified expectation of privacy in an 
area knowingly exposed to the public; thus, what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
That the observation of the hand truck was not 
inadvertent is patently absurd. Appellant seems to say that 
as long as the officers were watching him push the hand truck 
down the street, the observation was inadvertent; but that 
once the hand truck was placed inside the car, in open view, 
the officers no longer could legally view it because if they 
walked over to the car, the observation was no longer 
inadvertent. Furthermore, because inadvertent discovery 
appears no longer to be a requirement of the plain view 
doctrine, even if the discovery of the hand truck was not 
inadvertent, it remains within the plain view exception in 
warrantless searches. 
Appellant further claims that even if the 
observation was inadvertent, the evidentiary value of the hand 
truck was not immediately apparent when the evidence was first 
observed. The evidentiary value was not apparent, according 
to appellant, until the lettering was observed. However, the 
officers could have rationally concluded that the hand truck 
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had evidentiary value without knowing that the words "Stokes 
Brothers• were printed on it. The hand truck, if stolen or 
used in the commission of a crime, would have evidentiary 
value even if there had been nothing printed on it. Where 
appellant was suspected of criminal activity involving the 
hand truck in any way, the officers could have immediately 
determined that the hand truck had evidentiary value. The 
officer, therefore, could not be expected to ignore the hand 
truck merely because it had been placed inside a vehicle. 
Because the officers had a legal right to be in the 
area where appellant was stopped, they also had a right to let 
their eyes remain open and to view anything located in plain 
or open view. The officers were not required to ignore the 
evidence merely because it was placed inside appellant's 
vehicle after they had inadvertently observed appellant with 
the evidence. State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 
(1975). For these reasons, the hand truck was legally seized 
and properly admitted as evidence at trial. 
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, 
there was probable cause to believe that appellant's car 
contained evidence of crime. The United States Supreme Court 
provides an "automobile exception" to the requirement of a 
search warrant where it is not practical to secure a warrant 
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
jurisdiction. Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132 (1925). 
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In Carroll, the Court upheld a warrantless search of 
an automobile based on probable cause that the car contained 
evidence of contraband liquor. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
u.s. 42 (1970), the Court upheld the search of a car at a 
police station after the car's occupants were arrested for 
robbery. The Court reasoned that an immediate search is 
permissible because a car is movable, the occupants are 
alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained; The Chambers decision interpreted 
Carroll as distinguishing between auto searches and searches 
incident to arrest: 
• • • the search of an auto on probable 
cause proceeds on a theory wholly 
different from that justifying the search 
incident to arrest: "The right to search 
and the validity of the seizure are not 
dependent on the right to arrest. They 
are dependent on the reasonable cause the 
seizing officer has for belief that the 
contents of the automobile offend against 
the law." 
399 U.S. at 49. 
In this case, the officers had sufficient reason to 
believe that appellant's car contained evidence of crime. The 
officers observed appellant walking down the street with a 
hand truck which appellant placed inside the car. The 
officers believed that the hand truck was evidence of a crime 
based on the belief that appellant may have stolen the hand 
truck. Thus, the car was legally searched. 
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Finally, the record in this case does not indicate 
that the hand truck was introduced into evidence during the 
trial. The argument concerning the seizure of the hand truck 
took place during the suppression hearing before the judge, 
sitting without a jury. Thus, even if the hand truck were 
illegally seized, reversal is not required. State v. Romero, 
660 P.2d at 718. 
C. THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
APPELLANT • . : 
The arrest of appellant was proper because it 
complied with guidelines set by the legislature for situations 
in which an arrest can be made without a warrant. Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 77-7-2 (1953), as amended, provides: 
-,.. 
-,.. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, without 
warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) For a public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence; 
(2) When he has reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and 
has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person arrested has committed it; 
(3) When he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) Injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
The officers were justified in arresting appellant 
because of a reasonable belief that he had committed or was 
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attempting to commit a public offense under subsection (1). 
Only after the officers had questioned appellant and 
determined his explanation of the situation to be 
unsatisfactory did they place him under arrest. At that time, 
appellant himself as much as admitted that he was stealing the 
hand truck the officers had observed. The parties stipulated 
during the hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence that 
appellant told the officers that the hand truck was not his, 
.• 
that he had found it and .that he figured it would not be there 
much longer and so he took it becaue he could use it to move 
(R. 183, 185). The officers also noted that appellant was 
traveling in a direction away from a business known as "Stokes 
Brothers" and that the hand truck had the words "Stokes 
Brothers" printed on it. It was not unreasonable to assume 
that appellant had stolen the hand truck and was leaving the 
scene of the crime when the officers observed him. It was not 
necessary for the officers to wait until the crime had been 
reported before arresting appellant. It is not reasonable to 
-.,. 
say that police officers may not arrest someone who they 
believe is in the process of committing a crime because the 
victim has not yet reported that crime. 
Even if appellant was not still in the process of 
committing the crime, the officers could arrest him under 
subsection (3) based on a reasonable belief that he was going 
to flee or conceal the evidence. The officers watched 
appellant place the hand truck inside a vehicle. Appellant 
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could very easily have driven off with the hand truck, taking 
it and himself to an unknown location had the officers waited 
until they were able to obtain a warrant or until they 
obtained a report of the crime by the victim. For these 
reasons, the officers were justified in placing appellant 
under arrest. 
This Court said of ~ 77-13-3, the predecessor of 
§ 77-7-2, that: 
In performing his duties as authorized by 
this statute, a police officer is not 
required to meet any such standard of 
perfection as to demand an absolutely 
certain judgment before he may act. 
[Draper v. United States, 358 u.s. 307 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160 (1949).J The test to be applied 
is one which is reasonable and practical 
under the circumstances: whether a 
reasonable and prudent man in his position 
would be justified in believing facts 
which would warrant making the arrest 
[footnote omitted]. 
State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972). 
Thus, the officers need not have been certain that appellant 
had stolen the hand truck, they need only have had a 
reasonable belief that he had stolen it under all of the facts 
known to them at the time. Among these facts were: (1) 
Appellant told them he did not own the hand truck and that he 
had "found" it rather than borrowed or rented it (R. 183); (2) 
it was late afternoon on New Year's Day (R. 181) and most 
businesses are closed on that day; (3) the hand truck was 
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clearly lettered with the business name "Stokes Brothers" (R. 
195, 205)1 (4) appellant was walking in a direction leading 
away from "Stokes Brothers" (R. 184)1 (5) no one was at 
wstokes Brothers" at the time because it was a holiday and the 
officers were unable to locate anyone in authority from 
"Stokes Brothers" at the time of the arrest (R. 184, 194). 
From these facts and rational inferences the officers could 
infer that a crime had b~en committed and, therefore, lawfully 
arrest appellant without obtaining a warrant. 
D. THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S BACKPACK WAS 
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST1 THEREFORE 
THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN IT WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant argues that the gun, jewelry and other 
items admitted into evidence at trial should not have been 
admitted because the search of the backpack in which they were 
found was illegal. This claim is based on appellant's 
position that the police officers had no reasonable suspicion 
to stop and question him nor probable cause to search his car 
and arrest him. Therefore, the officers had no legal right to 
search the backpack and the evidence discovered in that search 
should have been suppressed. 
As argued above, the officers had reasonable 
justification to stop appellant and question him about his 
activities. The observation of the hand truck and the 
lettering on it was not a search, but was an "open view" 
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observation which the officers could lawfully make. From that 
observation, the officers had probable cause to arrest 
appellant. The search of appellant's backpack incident to 
that arrest was, therefore, legal. 
In Chirnel v. California, 395 u.s. 752 (1969), the 
Court held that a search incident to arrest could be conducted 
to prevent the arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying 
evidence, with the search extending to the arrestee's person 
and the area within his immediate control. Searches incident 
to arrest have been approved by this Court. See State v. 
Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973). A search 
incident to a lawful arrest can be conducted even where the 
suspect has been handcuffed. The defendant in custody need 
not be physically able to move about to justify a search 
within a limited area after an arrest has been made. State 
v. Austin, Utah, 584 P.2d 853 (1978)1 State v. Dixon, Utah, 
531 P.2d 1301 (1975). 
The backpack appellant carried at the time of his 
arrest was within his immediate control and easily accessible 
to him. For this reason,a search of the backpack was clearly 
a reasonable action on the part of the police officers who 
arrested appellant. 
E. APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT 
SPECIFICALLY TO THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED 
IN THE BACKPACK THUS WAIVING HIS RIGHT 
TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Although the printed motion form submitted to the 
trial court states that appellant sought suppression of all 
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the evidence to be introduced by the state, appellant raised 
no objection to the evidence contained in the backpack in his 
oral argument of that motion. The written motion appears to 
be a formality in this case where appellant's name and other 
references were merely typed into the blanks on a prepared 
form (R. 23). Because there was no argument at the hearing on 
the motion to suppress pertaining to the eviaence found insine 
appellant's backpack, appellant waived his right to object to 
this evidence on appeal •. · 
states: 
Recently, this Court cited a Kansas easel which 
The ••• rule long adhered to in this 
state requires timely and specific 
objection to admission of evidence in 
order for the question of admissibility to 
be considered on appeal. • • • By making 
use of the rule, counsel gives the trial 
court the opportunity to conduct the trial 
without using the tainted evidence, and 
thus avoid possible reversal and a new 
trial. Furthermore, the rule is 
practically one of necessity if litigation 
is ever to be brought to an end (Emphasis 
added). 
State v. Larocco, Utah, P. 2d (Case No. 18267, filed 
May 23, 1983). See also: State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 
942 (1982). 
Appellant's objection and motion to suppress in this 
case were neither timely nor specific as to the evidence 
lstate v. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923 
(1975). 
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contained inside the backpack. This failure to specifically 
object at trial waives appellant's right to raise the issue of 
the admissibility of that evidence on appeal. 
F. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL FITS 
WITHIN UTAH'S GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
The Exclusionary Rule is a rule of evidence which 
holds that evidence against a criminal suspect must be 
suppressed if it was obt~ined in any manner that violates the 
~ 
Fourth Amendment rights of suspects. Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383 (1914). The United States Supreme Court later 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the application of 
the rule in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
The United States Supreme Court has decided to consider 
whether the Exclusionary Rule should be modified to provide a 
"good faith" exception. See Illinois v. Gates, 32 Crim. L. 
Rptr. 4405 (December 1, 1982). 
The State of Utah has provided an alternative remedy 
to the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases. The remedy is 
intended to be: 
••.• in lieu of the exclusion of evidence 
in criminal cases for violation of the 
constitutionally protected rights except 
where those violations are substantial and 
peace officers were not acting in good 
faith. 
Utah Code Ann., S 78-16-1 (Interim Supp. 1982). Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 78-16-5 (Interim Supp. 1982) provides: 
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No evidence which is otherwise competent 
and admissible shall be excluded from any 
criminal proceeding because of the 
violation of fourth amendment rights 
except evidence which, though otherwise 
admissible, was secured in a method which 
involved a substantial violation of fourth 
amendment rights as provided in subsection 
77-35-12(9). 
Thus, a criminal suspect who claims that evidence was 
unlawfully seized cannot ordinarily have the evidence excluded 
but must pursue two remedies: (1) seek the statutory damages 
provided in§ 78-16-1, et seq., or (2) make a motion for 
suppression of the evidence where there is a substantial 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Unless such a 
substantial violation is shown, the evidence will be admitted 
in all cases under the Utah good faith exception, even if 
unlawfully seized. 
Even assuming in the instant case that the evidence 
was unlawfully seized, it was properly admitted. Appellant 
has s~Qwn no substantial violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights as required by Utah Code Ann., ~ 78-16-8 (Interim Supp. 
1982). That section provides as follows: 
In determining whether fourth amendment 
rights have been violated, the trier of 
fact shall consider the standards 
described in subsection 77-35-12(9) for 
determining whether the violation was 
substantial, grossly negligent, willful, 
or malicious or whether the conduct of the 
peace officer was in good faith. 
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Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-12(g) (Interim Supp. 1982) provides in 
pertinent part: 
• • • (2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in 
all cases be deemed substantial if one or 
more of the following is established by 
the defendant or applicant by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly 
negligent, willful, malicious, shocking to 
the conscience of the court or was a 
result of the practice of the law 
enforcement ag~ncy pursuant to a general 
order of that agency; 
(ii) the violation was intended only 
to harass without legitimate law 
enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer 
was acting in good faith under this 
section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, 
some or all of the following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal 
search and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion 
will tend to deter future violations of 
search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of a search warrant, 
arrest warrant, or relying on previous 
specific directions of a magistrate or 
prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was 
invaded. 
If appellant had established a substantial violation of his 
rights, the evidence was still properly admitted because the 
officers were acting in good faith. Bad faith cannot be 
implied from the facts in this case where the officers were 
acting on initial observations from a position in which they 
or any member of the public had a right to be. As discussed 
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above, the officers had a legal right to be in the area where 
appellant was initially observed pushing the hand truck. The 
stop of appellant for further questioning was not unlawful 
because the officers had a reasonable justification to stop 
him. The seizure of the hand truck was not the result of a 
search and, therefore, was not illegal. Appellant's 
subsequent arrest was based on probable cause as a result of 
that seizure and the subsequent search of his backpack was 
incident to arrest. This Court has stated that: 
••• it is essential that a reasonable 
degree of tolerance be indulged as to the 
judgment of police officers, so long as 
they are acting in good faith and within 
the standards of decent and decorous 
behavior. 
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973). 
Because the actions of the police officers in this case were 
in good faith and within the standards of decent and decorous 
behavior, the evidence was properly received by the trial 
court. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
APPELLANT OF THEFT BY RECEIVING AND 
CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
Appellant contends that the State failed to 
establish a prima facie case of theft by receiving and 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon because all elements 
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of each offense were not established beyond a reasonable doubt 
as required by Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-408 (1953), as amended. 
Appellant's argument focuses on the mental state of each crime 
and asserts that no evidence was presented by the State 
establishing those mental states. Because the requisite 
mental states were not proved with direct evidence, appellant 
assumes that the jury was required to believe his testimony 
negating the required mens rea for each crime, thus 
establishing appellant's innocence. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is 
well established that it must appear that reasonable minds 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that appellant 
committed the crime. State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 
(1977). Unless evidence compels a conclusion that as a matter 
of law evidence was inconclusive or so unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that appellant did not commit the crime, the 
verdict must be sustained. State v. Newbold, Utah, 581 P.2d 
991 (1978); State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975). The 
evidence need not refute contrary allegations made by 
appellant if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980); State v. Howell, 
Utah, 649 P.2d 91 (1982). The evidence, and all inferences 
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, is to be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the fact finder's verdict. State v. 
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Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979). It is not the prerogative 
of this Court to weigh the evidence, but that of the fact 
finder to assess its weight and sufficiency. State v. Romero, 
Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976). 
Appellant in this case does not claim that the State 
failed to prove any element of the crime of theft by receiving 
except the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his 
property. At trial, appellant's only defense was his own 
testimony that he intended to return the stolen property to 
its rightful owner. This testimony was self-serving and the 
jury was only obliged to afford it what credibility it 
deserved. Clearly, the jury did not believe appellant's 
explanation, but instead drew the only reasonable inference 
possible from the evidence presented by the State, that 
inference being that appellant intended to permanently deprive 
the rightful owner of possession of the property. The 
evidence supporting this inference was that: (1) appellant 
knew the property was stolen as early as December 14 (R. 291, 
297), yet by his own testimony refused at that time to take 
any of the property, although it was offered to him (R. 300-
301), choosing instead to purchase the goods with his own 
funds on December 31 (R. 306). Appellant also testified at 
one point that he knew who was the rightful owner of the 
property on December 14 (R. 319), although he originally said 
that he did not know to whom the goods belonged on December 14 
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(R. 302). These facts support the inference that appellant 
never intended to return the property to the rightful owner 
because it is only reasonable to assume that appellant would 
not want to use his own money to pay for goods he had no 
intention of keeping. The jury might also have assumed that 
if appellant had wanted to restore the property to its 
rightful owner, he would have acted as soon as he discovered 
who that owner was. (2) Appellant knew who had stolen the 
property and where that Person could be found on December 14 
(R. 297), the date of the burglary (R. 153), but did not 
notify the police until after he was arrested for possession 
of the stolen goods (R. 248-249). Had appellant desired to 
help the rightful owner regain his property, appellant could 
reasonably be expected to notify the police with any 
information he had rather than waiting until he was arrested. 
At least appellant might have notified the rightful owner so 
that he might inform the police. Appellant, of course, 
-~ 
answers these possible avenues of action with the assertion 
that he did not desire to be labeled a "snitch". It is 
possible, however, to notify law enforcement authorities of 
criminal activity without subjecting oneself to such labeling. 
A person could make use of facilities for anonymous "tips" or 
demand protection in return for information and/or testimony. 
The jury, therefore could reasonably determine that this was 
not believable testimony. (3) Appellant admitted that he 
helped the persons who had stolen the property to attempt to 
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dispose of it by giving them the names of businesses that 
might purchase the goods and by accompanying one of them to 
the location of these businesses (R. 297-299). An attempt to 
dispose of the goods or to aid in their disposal by sale to 
third parties leads to the logical conclusion that appellant 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property 
rather than the conclusion that appellant intended to return 
the property. (4) Appellant claimed, on separate occasions, 
that he told Julie what he intended to do with the Broadbent 
property and that he did not tell Julie what he planned to do 
(R. 347, 375). Because Julie did not testify at trial, there 
is no evidence as to appellant's intentions other than his own 
contradictory self-serving testimony. (5) Appellant told 
conflicting stories to the police at the time of his arrest 
and at trial (R. 365, 368, 370-372, 387, 395). From this the 
jury could infer that appellant was not a credible witness 
and, therefore, might not have believed his testimony on the 
issue of intent. 
Taking all of this evidence together and viewing it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could 
reasonably have concluded that appellant intended to 
permanently deprive the rightful owner of his property. Even 
though appellant denied that was his intent, the jury was not 
obligated to believe appellant's testimony. For this reason, 
there was clearly sufficient evidence to establish the 
requisite intent. 
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Applying the same principles to the offense of 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, it is equally clear 
that appellant had the appropriate mental state required by 
that statute. Appellant correctly states that Utah Code Ann., 
S 76-10-504 (1953), as amended, does not state the mental 
culpability required and that, therefore, S 76-2-102 provides 
the appropriate mental state. Section 76-2-102 provides that: 
When the definition of the offense does 
not specify a culpable mental state, 
intent, knowledge or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. 
Thus, the Stae was required to show that appellant was at 
least reckless in carrying the pistol in his backpack when he 
was arrested. Recklessly is defined as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
• • • (3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he is aware of but consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-2-103 (1953), as amended. The evidence 
presented in this case was sufficient to prove that appellant 
was reckless in carrying the gun in his backpack. That 
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evidence was: (1) Appellant admitted that he put the gun in 
the backpack around 4:00 a.m. (R. 310, 312); (2) Appellant 
remembered that the gun was there while he was in a 
neighborhood market at approximately 2:00 p.m. (R. 313-314), 
although he also testified that he remembered it while on his 
way to the market (R. 327-328); (3) Appellant was arrested at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. (R. 181). From these facts, the jury 
could reasonably conclude that appellant was reckless in 
placing the gun in his backpack from the start. Because 
appellant was the person who had originally placed the gun 
inside the backpack, it was also reckless to disregard the 
fact that he had placed a gun in a position where it might 
easily be carried out onto the street as a concealed weapon. 
It was further recklessness to continue to carry the gun 
concealed inside the backpack when he realized it was there. 
Furthermore, the jury was not obligated to believe 
appellant had forgotten that the gun was inside the backpack. 
Because appellant's testimony was contradictory, the jury 
might very well have discounted the testimony to that effect 
and concluded that appellant knew the gun was there. 
Appellant admitted that he placed the gun inside the backpack 
less than 12 hours before he left the house. A reasonable 
jury could determine that a person does not easily forget that 
he has placed a dangerous weapon inside of a backpack that he 
plans to carry with him when he leaves, especially when that 
-37-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gun was found outside a person's home after an apparent 
burglary. The jury could reasonably infer from the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the gun and its 
placement inside the backpack that appellant knew the gun was 
there and, consequently, acted knowingly in carrying it inside 
the backpack. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to 
convict appellant of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. 
CONCLUSION 
There was sufficient justification for the police 
officers to detain appellant when he was observed pushing a 
hand truck on January 1, 1981. The observation of the hand 
truck was not a search and, therefore, its seizure and 
introduction into evidence were proper. 
Based on their observations and the lettering on the 
hand truck, the officers had probable cause to arrest 
appellant. The search of appellant's backpack occurred after 
his arrest and was, therefore, justifiable as a search 
incident to arrest. For that reason, the evidence obtained 
during that search was admissible at trial. 
Finally, the evidence at trial was sufficient to 
convict appellant of theft by receiving and carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon. The judgment of the court below 
should, therefore, be affirmed and appellant's requests for 
reversal or a new trial should be denied. 
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1983. 
Respectfully submitted this 
~ £'( day of June, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERT~FICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Linda E. 
Carter, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, R4111, this 
IL./ day of June, 1983. 
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